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Recent Decisions
ZONING-AuTHORITY

To DETERMINE SITUS OF

SCHOOLs-The Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court has held that a statute investing school districts
with the power to choose location of schools precludes townships from
applying their zoning regulations to restrict construction of a school
on a tract chosen by the school directors.
PernbertonAppeal,' 439 Pa. 249, 252 A.2d 597 (1969).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with the problem of
whether the authority of a school district or that of the township's
zoning board should prevail in regard to the location of schools within
the confines of the township.
The controversy arose when the school authority acquired a tract of
land with the unanimous approval of the school directors and decided
to erect an elementary school thereon. The school authority's application for a certificate of occupancy was denied by the building inspector.
The School District appealed to the Board of Adjustment where it also
requested a variance in the zoning scheme. The Board of Adjustment
dismissed the appeal and denied the request for a variance on the basis
that the tract was situated in a zoning district that did not permit
schools under any conditions.
The lower court held that the township was without authority to
regulate the location of public school buildings. In affirming, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on the Public School Code of 1949.
Section 702 provides in part:
The location and amount of any real estate required by any school
district for school purposes shall be determined by the board of
by a vote of the majority of all
school directors of such district,
2
the members of such board.
However, the court was confronted with Section 58103 of the First
Class Township Code which grants to townships of the first class the
necessary power to enact zoning regulations. Section 58103 provides
in part:
Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive
1. This case is referred to as Appeal of Radnor Township Authority in the Atlantic
Reporter.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 7-702 (1949).
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plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure
safety from fire, panic and other dangers, to promote health and
general welfare, to provide adequate light and air and to prevent
the overcrowding of land to avoid undue concentration of population, to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements.3
Radnor Township had enacted its zoning regulations pursuant to these
sections.
Justice O'Brien, speaking for the court, found no conflict between
these statutes because the power of the Township to regulate schools
is a general power while the school district's authority to determine
the situs of schools is a specific power. The Court furthermore reasoned
that even if a conflict was found to exist, the school district would
4
prevail as a result of Section 63 of the Statutory Construction Act
which resolves such conflicts in favor of the specific legislation.
The court considered two cases presented by the township as authority for the proposition that the ultimate power of deciding the
location of schools inherently lies within the zoning power of the
township.
School District of Philadelphia v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 5
involved the problem of whether the City of Philadelphia had the
power to apply its zoning regulations concerning off-street parking to
the school district. The court thoroughly considered the Public School
Code6 which places in the School District the discretion of determining
the situs upon which schools are to be erected. In interpreting this
power the court found that the provisions of the school code by no
means give the school districts plenary powers over their physical
plants. The school districts, though enjoying some of the attributes
of sovereignty of the Commonwealth, have limited powers and these
powers do not include the police power. Philadelphia had enacted the
zoning legislation pursuant to the Zoning Enabling Act 7 and later
pursuant to the First Class City Home Rule Act. 8 As the zoning regulation was reasonable and since the school district lacked the police
power, the court saw no reason why the school district should be immune from the zoning ordinance. The court in dictum specifically
3. Id., tit. 53 § 58103.
4. Id., tit. 46 § 563 (1937).
5. 417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 (1965).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 7-702 (1949).
7. Id., tit. 53 § 14752 (1929).
S. Id., § 13131 (1949).
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left unanswered the question in Radnor, but intimated that the city
could probably not "zone out" schools entirely.9
The Radnor court found little difficulty in distinguishing Philadelphia. The court noted that the Philadelphia home rule charter gave
to it broader authority than that possessed by first class townships such
as Radnor. More importantly, the Philadelphiacase did not involve
zoning regulations purporting to exclude schools from certain areasthe precise question presented in Radnor.
In Wilkinsburg-PennJoint Water Authority v. ChurchhillBorough1 °
plaintiff was a joint municipal authority incorporated under the
Municipal Authorities Act." The Water Authority's function was to
provide water services for consumption, health, and fire protection.
Defendant was a borough regulated by the Borough Code. 2 The Authority, in attempting to better its water service, desired to build an
elevated water tank in an area where such structures were prohibited
by the zoning board. The water authority argued its immunity from
the borough's zoning restrictions based on Section 306 Subdivision B(h)
of the Municipal Authorities Act1 3 which gave the Authority the

power "to determine by itself exclusively the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe, and reasonable service." In
apparent conflict to the water authority's power was Section 3302(a)
of the Borough Code which provides:
For any and all purposes, the council may divide the borough into
districts. .

.

. Within such districts it may regulate and restrict

the erection, construction, reconstruction,
alteration, repair or use
14
of buildings, structures, or land.
The court, as in the instant case, was thus faced with resolving two
conflicting powers over the same subject matter, i.e., the erection of a
water tower on a zoned tract of land. The court examined the Borough
Code and found that nowhere is property owned by an Authority expressly excepted from regulation by the boroughs. It reasoned that
the property must be subject to the jurisdiction of the zoning authorities unless a different inference could be drawn from the legislation.
The water authority thought that the inference to its immunity was
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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417 Pa. 277, 290, 207 A.2d 864, 871 (1965).
417 Pa. 93, 207 A.2d 905 (1965).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 301 (1945).
Id., § 45101 (1966).
Id., § 306B(h) (1955).
Id., § 48202 (1966).
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implicit in Section 306 of the Municipal Authorities Act 15 quoted
above.
The court attempted to give effect to both statutes and to interpret
them so as to attain the legislative objectives. The court recognized
that the powers of the two municipal corporations had the same general schemes and proceeded to reconcile the apparent conflict by
examining their comprehensiveness and the legislative intent behind
each; It found that the provisions of the Borough Code' 6 under which
Churchill Borough had enacted its zoning regulations were broader
and in fact encompassed the initiatives of the water authority. This
would indicate that the zoning power must be exercised in due regard
to the water authority so as not to hinder the water service. Furthermore, nothing in the Municipal Authorities Act commands that the
decisions of the Authority compliment the comprehensive zoning plan
of the Borough, and in fact, nothing in the Act would prevent the
Authority from acting in direct contradiction to the comprehensive
plan. The court therefore concluded that the objectives of both municipal corporations could best be attained only if the Authority's power
was subservient to the Borough's zoning power.
The Radnor court distinguished Wilkinsburg by reference to the
enabling legislation. The court stated that the Authority's power "to
determine by itself exclusively the services and improvements required
to provide adequate, safe, and reasonable service" was not a specific
power to locate its services. The provision was so general that no power
to locate actually existed. The court contrasted the above provision
with Section 702 of the Public School Code 17 which vests specific power
in the school districts to locate, determine, and acquire real estate for
the purpose of erecting schools. Thus the school district's power was
one specifically enumerated whereas the water authority's power was
of a general nature.
Two questions must be asked at this point. Did the court adequately
deal with the conflict of power issue? What are the possible implications of the court's decision?
Assuming the provisions of the Public School Code to be more specific than those of the Municipal Authorities Act, it is believed that
15. Id., § 306B(h) (1955).
16. Id., § 48203 (1966).
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic and other
dangers, to promote health and general welfare.
17. id., tit. 24 § 7-702 (1949).
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the statutory construction utilized by the instant court is simply not
responsive to the analysis of the Wilkinsburg case. The Wilkinsburg
court was not concerned with which statute was more specific,' 5 but
rather attempted to focus in on the very nature of the statutory provisions and the legislative intent behind each. By concluding that the
objectives of the zoning regulations were more comprehensive and
that the water authority was only one segment of the overall zoning
scheme, the court was recognizing and placing great relevance upon the
comprehensive plan.
It is submitted that this line of reasoning is equally applicable to
the instant decision. The court might well have concluded that the
township's power to enact zoning regulations is more comprehensive
than the school district's power to locate schools. Proceeding with the
rationale of Wilkinsburg, the court might have reasonably found that
in order to preserve the comprehensive plan, the school district's authority must be subordinate to the township's.
The Radnor decision seems to indicate a departure from the customary approach to the zoning dilemma. Previously, there was a presumption in favor of the validity of a zoning ordinance 19 so long as
the regulation is necessary for the preservation of public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare and is not unjustly discriminatory or arbitrary. 20 However, at no point in the Radnor litigation was the reasonableness of the township's zoning plan in question.
There are several approaches in determining the question of whether
or not a zoning board's regulation should prevail against competing
municipal corporation's interests.
This article will proceed to examine these approaches as they apply
specifically to school districts and further how they apply to other municipal corporations.
One approach concludes that schools are immune from legislation
18. Id., tit. 53 § 48201 (1966). It seems apparent that if the Radnor court was concerned with specificity, section 48201 should have met the requirement. Section 48201
provides that:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare, councils
of boroughs are hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories, and size of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or
other purposes, and also to establish and maintain building lines upon any or all
streets.
19. Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509, 94 A.2d 737 (1953); Schmalz v. Buckingham Township Board of Adjustment, 389 Pa. 295, 132 A.2d 233 (1957); Cleaver v.
Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); National Land and Investment
Company v. Eastown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, (1965).
20. Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951).
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in regard to locating the schools. This conclusion is reached by accepting as a basic premise that the school district is the official body responsible for educating the youth of the municipality and the zoning board
cannot disrupt the school district from carrying out the function en21
trusted to it by the state.
A similar result may be reached by applying agency principles. In
Town of Atherton v. Superior Court22 the court looked upon the
school district as an agent of the sovereign. The school district in
acquiring beneficial ownership of property is only acting in the capacity of an agent and ultimate beneficial ownership rests with the principal, the state. Therefore, when the school district asserts authority
it is acting in behalf of its sovereign. The zoning board not being in
the agency relationship with the state must yield to the school district's
authority.
A governmental-proprietary test has been applied by a number of
jurisdictions to determine whether a municipal corporation is immune
or not. Governmental functions are those required by legislative mandate and involving a direct benefit to the general public, while an
activity conferring private advantages pursuant to permissive legislation
is proprietary. If the agency in question falls within the governmental
23
framework, it is deemed to be immune.
In Lauderdale County Board of Education v. Alexander 24 the construction and operation of a county barn to store buses and school supplies was deemed a governmental function and hence not subject to a
city zoning ordinance.
Hall v. City of Taft25 typifies another line of reasoning in regard

to the predicament of school authority versus the power of the zoning
board. The issue confronting the court was whether a building code
was applicable to the construction of the school. The court reasoned
that the state had completely occupied the field of regulating public
21. In Union Free School District v. Village of Hewlitt Bay Park, 102 N.Y.S.2d 81,
198 Misc. 932 (1950), a village ordinance sought to exclude public high schools from certain residential areas. In invalidating the ordinance, the court found that the school is
an official body of the state and that the zoning board may not obstruct the school in
carrying out its function. See also: Buck v. State, 96 N.Y.S.2d 667, 198 Misc. 575 (1950):
"Public education is a state, and not a municipal, function."
22.

169 Cal. 2d 417, 324 P.2d 328 (1958).

23. City of Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School District, 254 Iowa 900,
119 N.W.2d 909 (1963), (locating bulk gasoline tank was governmental); Davidson County
v. Harmur, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956), (construction of hospital is governmental).
24. 269 Ala. 79, 110 So. 2d 911 (1959).
25. 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).

427

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 8: 422, 1970

school building construction, and therefore schools are not subject to
the building regulations of the municipal corporation.
This decision, however, can only be read accurately in light of
Pasadena School District v. City of Pasadena.26 In that decision the
court recognized that the local school officials had the power to locate,
plan and construct buildings but gave overriding importance to the
protections which only existing'zoning standards could assure. However, the court alluded that:
the state undoubtedly might provide for a complete system of
regulation for the protection of the public health, safety and
27
comfort in erection of school buildings. But this it has not done.
The legislature of California apparently in reaction to the court's
suggestion passed the following: "The Division of Architecture shall
pass upon and approve or reject all plans for the construction or
alteration (or addition to) any school building. 28 Without this comprehensive legislation to support the preemption of the schools it is
submitted Hall v. City of Taft could not stand. The danger is that
other courts may apply the decision without the prerequisite legislation.
The enabling legislation of the school district in the Radnor case
was very similar to the legislation of the Pasadena case. Should not
the legislation conferring the powers to the school districts or similar
municipal corporations be very persuasive before the court overrides
the zoning power of the municipality?
Perhaps the most widely accepted approach until recent years was
to rely on formal presumptions when an overlap resulted between
city and school authority. These decisions gave greatest weight to the
local police power because by its very nature it is pervasive and survives unless an explicit statute circumvents the presumption.2 9 This
rationale is dependent on construing the city and school district as
subdivisions of equal status.
If the immunity could be limited to school districts, the zoning
boards might be able to adequately cope with a paucity of exceptions.
The perplexing problem is that these principles are readily applicable
to other municipal corporations. At the point these theories are transferred to the other municipal corporations the sanctity of the comprehensive plan is at stake.
26.
27.
28.

29.
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166 Cal.7, 134 P. 985 (1913).
Id. at 8, 135 P. at 986.
47 Cal. 2d 177, 183, 302 P.2d 574, 580 (1956).
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The theory that an organization which is carrying out the function
of the state is immune was applied to an institution erected for the
care of the blind. In Kentucky Institution for Education of the Blind
v. City of Louisville,3 0 the court ruled that the city could not apply
its zoning ordinance relating to fire escapes because the institution
was an instrument of the state government and therefore was completely under state control.
Decisions like this are expanding the immunity doctrine to include
organizations which the devisers of the naked theories could not have
envisioned to include. The fact that a building for the blind is built
under the auspices of the state should not lead to the conclusion carte
blanche that all aspects including safety factors (fire escapes) are
beyond zoning legislation.
The agency principle can often lead to unjustifiable results as the
case of C. J. Kubach Company v. McGuire3 l points out. In that case
the board of public works directed their president to sign a contract
for the erection of a new city hall building. The president refused to
do so because the plans for the building called for its elevation to be
two hundred feet, a violation of the city's charter which limited the
height to one hundred fifty feet. The court, however, stated that the
charter of the city is not only the organic law of the city, but it is
also a law of the state. The court went on to conclude that the city
by reason of acquiring the charter became an agent of the state. The
city therefore should not be subject to its own restrictions.
The court has concluded that the city, being an agent of the sovereign, is completely unbridled in regard to its building decisions. The
inequities are readily apparent. The comprehensive plan sought to be
achieved by the charter regulations is made nugatory because the state
declares a city to be its agent. With only a few nonconforming state
agencies the entire cities development plans are frustrated.
The Hall v. City of Taft3 2 type approach can easily be extended

to include all state organizations because the very nature of being state
oriented may imply preemption. Once this step is taken, the area of

preemption must necessarily be broad in scope because the state's
activities are so wide and diversified. This kind of thinking has over33
flowed in other state functions.

30. 123 Kentucky 767, 97 S.W. 402 (1906).
31. 199 Cal. 215, 248 P.676 (1926).
32. 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
33. DiMidio Appeal, 11 Chest. 406, 411 (1963): "a municipality may not

...

attempt
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The governmental-proprietary test, by its very nature, results in a
variety of municipal corporations being classified as governmental and
therefore receiving immunity treatment. For example the erection and
operation of a county jail by the county was classified as governmental
in Green County v. City of Monroe,34 the result being that the zoning
board had no say as to its location or construction. This approach has
been highly criticized by a number of sources.A5
Perhaps a more favorable result was reached in City of Richmond v.
Board of Supervisors.36 The dispute in that case also involved the locating of a jail in violaton of a city zoning ordinance. The court did not
apply the governmental-proprietary test, but instead noted that the
statutes giving the city the right to establish a jail do not expressly or
impliedly authorize the city to establish a penal institution in violation
of the zoning ordinances. Instead the statutes conferring power to
enact zoning provisions and those authorizing another municipal corporation to pursue another activity should be interpreted to give full
force and effect to both statutes. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the
zoning ordinance should control.
What the Richmond court did was to apply the presumption in
favor of the zoning board when the conflict could not be decided
otherwise. This approach had been given most favorable treatment
by the courts until its recent decline in the past years. Part of the
reason may be due to the court's recognition that the zoning power
was abused by local authorities. Also the deviation may be the result of the present tendency for local power to flow back to the sovereign. Furthermore there is no doubt that certain state functions to be
effectively administered, must be free of local restraint.
This brief survey makes clear that the court today is faced with a
variety of approaches to diminish the zoning power of municipalities.
The Radnor decision seems to be adding another mode of assault by
which municipal corporations can challenge the local zoning power.
All that is required is to produce an enabling statute that is more specific than the corresponding zoning legislation. Obviously, the Radnor
decision cannot be limited to the narrow issue of locating schools. 37
For example, section 306 B(u) of the Municipal Authorities Act
to control through zoning the business of dispensing liquor, that field being preempted
by the Commonwealth .... " The court cited Appeal of Sawdey, 269 Pa. 19, 112 A.120
(1951).
34. 3 Wisc. 2d 196, 87 N.W.2d 827 (1958).
35. Note, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary
Test, 22 VA. L. REY. 910 (1936).
36. 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 306B(u) (1955):
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provides the Public Utility Commission with specific powers. This
legislation would seem to be more specific than the zoning board's
and why should not the Public Utility Commission be able to operate
free of zoning restrictions? But the immunity need not necessarily
stop with this organization. Redevelopment and parking authorities,
sewage treatment plants, and other municipal corporations might be
able to introduce similar statutes thereby placing the comprehensive
zoning plan at the whim of other municipal corporations. Beyond this,
the Radnor decision encourages conflicts among municipal authorities
which are ideally presumed to be working for a common goal-the
orderly development of the cities. Conflicts are certain to result if
municipal coporations are aware that they can achieve immunity by
challenging the board with more specific legislation. A multiplicity
of lawsuits testing respective legislation is also a strong possibility. The
case seemingly destroys what vestiges of the comprehensive plan remained and offers no substitute.
The zoning problem is critical. As illustrated by the synopses of
theories applicable to zoning, if one applies the governmental-proprietary test and then applies the presumption test, divergent results are
reached.
Solutions to the dilemma are necessarily difficult. Perhaps part of
the difficulty lies in the ineptness of the legislature to clearly define
the individual powers of the municipal corporations. Additional amendments might alleviate some of the conflicts, but the ultimate decision
still remains with the court. Only by interpreting statutes in a manner
prescribed to give as much credence as possible to both conflicting statutes can the courts adequately deal with the problem. The recentlyenacted Municipal Planning Code 38 may be the legislation the courts
need to revitalize the comprehensive zoning plan. The Municipal
Planning Code provides that:
Following the adoption of a comprehensive plan or any part
thereof by a county, pursuant to a public notice, any proposed
action of the governing body within the county relating to (i) the
location, opening, vacation, extension, widening, narrowing or
enlargement of any street, public ground, pierhead or watercourse;
(ii) the location, erection, demolition or sale of any public structure
Subject to the approval of the Public Utility Commission before which an authority
may institute proper proceedings to construct tunnels, bridges, viaducts, underpasses
or other structures and relocate the facilities of public service companies to effect or
permit the abolition of a grade crossing or grade crossings. . ..
38. Id., § 10101 (1969).
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located within the municipality; or (iii) the adoption, amendment
or repeal of any official map, subdivision or land ordinance, zoning
ordinance or planned residential development ordinance shall be
submitted to the county planning agency for its recommendations.
The recommendation of the planning agency shall be made to the
governing body of the municipality within thirty days.39
In relation to school districts the Code also provides that:
Any proposed action of the governing body of any school district
located within the municipality or county relating to the location,
demolition, removal or sale of any school district structure shall
be submitted to the
municipal or county planning agency for its
40
recommendations .

It is proposed that the practical solution is to allow the zoning power
to rest predominantly with the zoning board who are best equipped and
qualified to plan for the orderly development of the cities. The courts
should only circumvent the zoning authority when the opposing municipal corporation can: (1) establish that the zoning legislation is not
reasonably related to the health, safety and morals of the community;
or (2) demonstrate that the legislation upon which it bases its authority
is so comprehensive that it rebuts the presumption in favor of the
zoning board's authority.
Frederick B. Gieg, Jr.

LABOR

LAW-DECERTIFICATION-UNION

DISCIPLINE-The

National

Labor Relations Board has held that the union commits an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of National Labor Relations
Act when it fines a member who is attempting to institute decertification proceedings against it, because the fine is not only a punitive measure which inhibits access by the member to the processes of the Board
but is also an ineffective deterrent to decertification.
InternationalMolders and Allied Workers Union, Local 125, AFLCIO (Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc.). 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M.
1049 (1969).
Approximately one year after the incumbent union was certified, several of its members began canvassing their fellow employees to seek
enough support to petition for a decertification election. The union
39.
40.
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